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Investigative draft. Every figure below is drawn from Exeter Township's audited financial statements, its published invitation to bid, the recorded sale agreement, the municipal bond record, and the Board of Supervisors' own meeting minutes. When Exeter Township advertised the Reading Country Club for sale in the summer of 2024, the terms were plain. The winning bidder would pay the purchase price "in full" within sixty days, in cash, at a minimum of $4,805,000. The legal notice ran in the Reading Eagle on August 29, 2024, over the signature of the Township Solicitor, "J. Chadwick Schnee, Esq., Solicitor." The sale drew exactly one bid. The Township opened sealed bids on September 27, 2024, and DCM Investments, LLC, an entity tied to the Gulati family, was the only bidder. Its offer of $4,805,100 stood precisely $100 above the Township's published minimum of $4,805,000. The deal that actually closed four months later bore little resemblance to that advertisement. DCM paid $2,805,100 in cash and handed the Township a $2,000,000 promissory note due in ten years. The Township's own auditors valued that note at $1,227,827 on the day it was signed, roughly $772,000 below its face amount, a discount that reflects a note bearing little or no interest across its ten-year life. The Township's audited financial statements record the outcome in one line: a "Loss on Disposal of Operations" of $3,911,065. And according to the Township's own minutes, the Board of Supervisors never voted to approve those terms. What the Board actually voted on The record shows the Board approved a straightforward, all-cash transaction and nothing more. On October 14, 2024, the supervisors voted five to nothing to award the bid to DCM Investments "in the amount of $4,805,100.00." That is the motion in the minutes. There is no motion approving a $2 million promissory note in place of cash. There is no motion accepting the legal opinion that the changed structure was permissible. The note and the reasoning behind it appear only in remarks the Chairman made at the table and in documents prepared by the Solicitor. Nor does the public record show that the Board was ever told what the note would cost. The Township's minutes are a summary rather than a word-for-word transcript, but they routinely record the substance of what officials present to the supervisors. On the note, they record almost none: no explanation by the Solicitor of its consequences, that it would be valued at roughly $772,000 below its face amount, that the sale would record a multimillion-dollar loss, or that taking financing instead of cash would lead the Township to defease its bonds, and no discussion among the supervisors of any of it. The public record reflects only the Chairman's single sentence that the arrangement had been "legally reviewed." Earlier that year, on March 11, 2024, the Board had delegated authority over the sale to the Township Manager, not the Solicitor, and that delegation carried an explicit condition: "any final sale documents shall be approved by the Board of Supervisors." The minutes record no such approval of the final terms. Three days before the award, on October 11, 2024, the Board met in executive session "to discuss the RCC bid." Executive sessions are closed to the public, and under Pennsylvania's Sunshine Act a board may deliberate in one but may not take any official action there. Whatever was discussed behind those doors, a decision to accept a $2 million note in place of cash had to be made by a public vote. The minutes record none. Terms no other bidder was offered Nowhere in the public record does anyone say why the change was made. No official explained what problem the note solved, whose interest it served, or why a deal advertised as all cash closed as something else. The minutes record the fact of the two-part structure and a single assurance that it was lawful, and nothing more. The change to the deal did more than cost the Township money. It altered the competition after the fact. Every prospective buyer had read the same advertisement: full payment, in cash, within sixty days. Anyone who could not or would not meet an all-cash price of nearly five million dollars had no reason to bid. The one bidder who did meet those terms was then permitted to close on far easier ones, paying part in cash and financing two million dollars through a note the Township carried itself. No other party had the opportunity to compete for the Reading Country Club on the terms the Township ultimately granted. The note, the reserves, and the 2% question Accepting a note instead of cash carried a consequence beyond the recorded loss. Because the Township took back financing rather than full payment, it could not use the all-cash path that federal tax rules provide for disposing of bond-financed property. Instead, it moved to retire the underlying bonds directly. On December 23, 2024, the Township deposited $9,246,693 of its reserves into an irrevocable escrow to defease $9,175,000 of outstanding general obligation bonds, most of them carrying interest of about 2%. At nearly the same time, the Township was preparing to borrow new money at a far higher rate. In October 2025 it issued $10,000,000 in general obligation bonds to fund a new fire and emergency-services facility. Every maturity of that issue carries an interest rate of 5%, according to the offering statement, on which Schnee Legal Services is again listed as Solicitor. The two decisions rest on opposite assumptions. Spending more than nine million dollars of reserves to extinguish 2% debt treats the Township's cash as abundant. Borrowing ten million dollars at 5% treats it as scarce. Both cannot be true at once, and whichever premise was correct, the other decision carried a cost. The Township's stated justification for the defeasance was that the bonds had to be satisfied because it would no longer own the country club. But the Solicitor himself told the Board, in explaining the four series being retired, that "three are non-taxable and one is taxable." A federally taxable bond series cannot require tax-driven remediation, which undercuts the claim that all of the debt had to be cleared as a consequence of the sale. The Solicitor at every step Across the transaction, one official was present at each stage. The Solicitor announced the bid terms to the Board, signed and placed the newspaper advertisement, and, according to the Chairman, provided the legal opinion that the cash-plus-note structure was "valid under Pennsylvania law." He recommended the defeasance. The existence of that opinion rests on the Chairman's word at the meeting. The document itself has never been produced, the Township resisted requests to release it, and the minutes reflect no vote requesting or accepting it. The transaction also spanned a period in which the Township had no settled management. The bid was launched under one interim manager, advertised under a second, and closed under a third who had started weeks earlier. Across all of it, the Solicitor was the constant. What the Township says, and what the records show about the club The supervisors have described the sale as a relief. The Chairman said it would free the Township from "ongoing financial burdens." Another supervisor said managing a country club "is not the Township's strength." The premise beneath that relief deserves scrutiny. The Reading Country Club was not a failing business the Township had unwisely bought. The Township took the land by eminent domain and took possession in January 2006, twenty years ago this year, a power available only for a public purpose. Its acquisition debt was then carried for two decades on a separate real-estate tax levied on every property owner, not on the golf operation. The Township's own audited statements show the club's operating deficit ran between roughly $270,000 and $363,000 a year, a modest figure for a public amenity, and a fraction of the multimillion-dollar "cost" that critics and officials alike have attached to it by folding the 2005 purchase debt into the operating picture. Ten years, then nothing The sale agreement requires the buyer to maintain the property "as a golf course and/or restaurant for a period of ten (10) years from the date of recording of the deed," and it expressly permits the construction of a hotel or motel on the site. After ten years, the agreement imposes no restriction at all. Nothing in it prevents the land, taken from private hands two decades ago to serve a public purpose, from being developed once the decade passes. The open questions The documents leave a set of questions the Township has not answered. Who approved changing the sale from all cash to a zero-interest note, and where is that vote? Where is the legal opinion said to justify it, and why has it never been released? Under what authority did the Township spend more than nine million dollars of reserves to retire cheap debt while borrowing expensively for its next project? And is the $2 million the Township is still owed backed by anything at all? The sale agreement conveys the property free and clear of liens and provides no mortgage or collateral for the note. It also names the buyer only as "DCM Investments, LLC or its corporate designee," which leaves a further question unanswered: whether that debt is the obligation of a single company and nothing more, or whether anyone stands personally behind it. The promissory note itself, which would answer that, has not been made public. For now, the answers reside in a legal opinion the public has not seen, in an executive session held behind closed doors, and in a set of minutes that record a vote for one deal and the closing of another. This account is built entirely from public records. The Reading Country Club sale agreement, the Township's audited financial statements for 2023 and 2024, the 2025 bond offering statement, and the 2024 Board of Supervisors minutes are available to any resident on request.
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A plain-language look at where the Township's finances have been, and where the numbers point next Let's start with a simple idea. A town, like a household, can own valuable things (a house, a car) and still be short on cash for the monthly bills. The valuable things are worth a lot, but you can't pay the electric bill with your roof. What matters for day-to-day life is whether you have flexible money on hand. For years, Exeter Township was short on that flexible money. At the end of 2018, the Township's “unrestricted” resources, the money available to spend on anything, were negative, by about $3.4 million. In plain terms, the Township had no real cushion. Its broader finances looked negative too, though part of that was a bookkeeping matter the Township later corrected when it formally recorded the value of buildings, roads, and equipment it already owned. Setting that bookkeeping piece aside, the simple truth was this: Exeter had little flexible money and a lot of long-term obligations. Then, in 2019, the Township sold its sewer system to a private water company for roughly $86 million. The effect was dramatic. The sale brought in a large pile of cash and wiped out much of the debt tied to the sewer system. The Township's overall financial position improved by roughly $78 million in a single year, swinging from negative territory to about positive $71 million. A town that had no cushion suddenly had tens of millions of dollars in spendable resources. It is worth pausing on whether that sale was even necessary. There is a strong argument, one I have long made, that it was not. A sewer system can be run on a sound financial footing the way successful private water companies run theirs: steady, predictable rates that cover costs and fund maintenance over time. Exeter's problem was never that a sewer system can't pay for itself. It was a lack of consistency, rates raised, then lowered, then raised again, with no steady plan. Run properly and consistently, the system could have stayed in public hands and kept serving residents without a one-time sale. That is a debate worth having, because the sale came with a permanent cost to residents. That cost did not show up on the Township's books. It showed up in residents' mailboxes. As a condition of the sale, the buyer required the Township to raise sewer rates before the deal even closed. Then, once the private company took over, it raised rates again. As a regulated utility, that company earns a guaranteed profit of around 6% on the money it invests, a profit resident never paid when the system was publicly owned. Today, many Exeter households pay combined water and sewer bills in the range of $200 to $300 a month. The Township got the cash. Residents got the higher bills, permanently. So, the real question is simple: what has the Township done with that one-time windfall? Here is the worrying part. Since that 2019 peak of about $71 million, the Township's financial position has been sliding back down, to about $61 million by the end of 2024. And the Township's own manager, in a forecast presented in October 2025, projected that the gap between what the Township spends and what it takes in will keep widening, from about $1.4 million a year now to nearly $3.9 million a year by 2030. That is not an outside critic's number. It is the Township's own projection. It means Exeter is spending more than it earns, and the shortfall is growing. What is covering that growing shortfall right now? Largely, the leftover sewer money. The Township still holds roughly $37 million of those one-time proceeds, and it has been using them to pay off debt, to plug operating gaps, and to fund big new projects. And the big new projects keep coming. The largest is a new fire and emergency services station, a roughly 30,000 square foot building. The Township has already authorized borrowing for it. The figure usually mentioned, about $23.6 million, deserves a hard look, because it is only a planning estimate. No actual contractor price has been obtained, and the estimate has already gone up once, from around $20 million. There is good reason to expect the final cost to be higher. Pennsylvania law requires public construction projects to pay set “prevailing wage” rates, which raises labor costs. Fire stations are also expensive to build: tall garage bays for the trucks, heavy reinforced floors, special exhaust systems, backup power, sleeping and living quarters. Once you add the land work, design fees, equipment, a cushion for surprises, and rising construction prices through a 2028 finish, the true all-in cost for a building this size could realistically land anywhere from the mid-$20 millions into the low-$30 millions. For perspective, a 30,000 square foot station would be among the largest and most expensive fire and EMS facilities in all of Berks County. Notice the order of events: the Township committed to borrowing the money and moved ahead on design before it ever got a real contractor's price. The financing came first; the true cost is still unknown. On a project this big, that should make any resident uneasy. The fire station is not the only commitment. The Township also just bought a separate administration building for about $1.4 million. On top of that, more spending is being talked about without firm plans: fixing up that newly bought building, converting the old township building for police use (which could need major and costly code work), and improvements to the public works department. The Township also gives its volunteer fire department around $1.5 million a year in support, a figure that tends to grow. And salaries and benefits, the biggest part of any town's budget, keep rising. Step back and you see the pattern: one commitment after another, several with price tags in the millions or tens of millions, and no clear, written, public plan tying them together or showing how they will be paid for once the one-time sewer money is gone. Against all of this, at a recent meeting the chairman of the board directed the Township Manager to go find new sources of revenue. But here is the trap: a second-class township in Pennsylvania has very few ways to raise money. Property taxes and earned income taxes are basically the only big levers. “Go find revenue” is easy to say and hard to do when the law gives you almost no options, and one of those options, a tax increase, was already used in 2024, and the Township's finances still went backward. Put it all together. Exeter escaped years of financial weakness not by fixing how it operates, but by selling a public asset it can only sell once, and residents are still paying for that sale every month in higher bills. The Township is now spending the proceeds faster than it can replace them, committing to tens of millions in new buildings and debt, while its own forecast shows the shortfall growing, and while asking staff to find revenue the law makes very hard to find. When the sewer money runs out, and at this rate that is a question of when, not if, what is the plan? What gets sold next time? There is no second sewer system. None of this is hidden. The financial figures are in the Township's own audited statements. The shortfall forecast came from the Township's own manager at a public meeting. The building and fire station commitments were voted in open session. What is missing is not the information. What is missing is a clear, written, public plan for closing a gap the Township admits it has, before the one-time money hiding it runs out. These are fair questions to ask at a public meeting. Every figure here comes from Exeter Township's own audited financial statements and public presentations. You can look them up. You should. This is the second in a series examining Exeter Township's finances using the Township's own public records.
Here’s What the Audit Says A look at Exeter Township’s own audited numbers for 2024 
If you live in Exeter Township, you paid more in taxes in 2024. The Township’s real estate tax rate went up, and it shows: real estate tax revenue climbed from about $4.3 million to roughly $5.9 million year over year, and earned income tax rose from about $3.9 million to $4.8 million. By any measure, that’s a substantial increase in what residents put into the Township’s coffers.
So here’s the question worth sitting with: with all that additional revenue coming in, how did the Township’s financial position get worse by nearly $7 million? That’s not an opinion. It’s on page 7 of the Township’s own audited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, prepared by the Township’s outside auditors. In plain terms, the audit reports that the Township’s “net position” — the broadest measure of its overall financial health — decreased by $6,790,987 in 2024, after increasing the year before. That’s roughly an $8.6 million swing in the wrong direction, in a single year, during a year taxes went up. How does that happen? The audit points to a few things. The Township sold the Reading Country Club in 2024 and recorded a loss of about $3.9 million on that sale. And the General Fund — the Township’s main operating account — only finished the year in positive territory because of about $1.5 million in transfers in from other funds. Strip those transfers out, and the General Fund’s day-to-day operations actually ran a shortfall of more than $1.1 million for the year. The Township’s own management says as much, in its own words. In the audit’s management discussion, the Township acknowledges it “faces a structural budget imbalance due to a trend of expense growth outpacing revenue growth.” Translation: the money going out is growing faster than the money coming in — and that was true even after the 2024 tax increase. None of this is hidden. It’s all in a public document, available for anyone to read. But it raises a fair question for residents: if a tax increase didn’t close the gap, what’s the plan to close it — and what happens to the roughly $37 million in one-time proceeds the Township is still holding from selling its sewer system years ago? Those are questions worth asking at a public meeting. The numbers in this piece all come from the Township’s own audited financial statements for 2024. You can read them yourself — and you should. This is the first in what may be a series examining Exeter Township’s finances using the Township’s own public records. Every figure here is drawn from the audited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024. First in a Series on Municipal Financial Transparency in Exeter Township.
Every spring, Pennsylvania law requires second-class townships like Exeter to publish a concise financial summary in a local newspaper of general circulation by April 15. Residents of Exeter Township are supposed to open the Reading Eagle and see a short legal notice summarizing total assets, liabilities, net position, revenues, expenditures, and changes in net position for the prior year—figures drawn from the township’s official Municipal Annual Audit and Financial Report (Form DCED-CLGS-30) filed with the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED). Yet for years, that notice has been missing. Independent verification of Reading Eagle archives confirms that Exeter Township has not published the required April 15 financial summary for:
The same is true for every prior year examined back to at least 2018. No such notices appear in the newspaper for April 15 of 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, or 2018. This is not an isolated oversight—it is a repeated, years-long failure to meet a clear statutory obligation under the Second-Class Township Code. The Intended Purpose of the DCED Report The DCED-CLGS-30 filing itself is the legal centerpiece of the state’s required “annual audit” process. The appointed auditor (currently Withum CPA) must file the standardized cash- or modified-cash-basis summary with DCED by April 1 each year. The state uses these reports for basic tracking, grant eligibility, and liquid fuels funding decisions. The April 15 newspaper publication is a separate but mandatory step intended to give the public minimal notice of the township’s financial position. This is the entire design: quick state compliance, bare-minimum public disclosure. The report is prepared on a regulatory (non-GAAP) basis. The auditor’s own opinion explicitly states that the work was done “in accordance with law rather than with generally accepted auditing standards” and that the statements “are not intended to present the financial position and results of operations in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.” In short, the system was built decades ago for simpler townships and simpler times. It was never intended to deliver timely, accurate, decision-useful information to the taxpayers who pay the bills. Significant Weaknesses and Inadequacies Beyond the complete absence of the required newspaper notices, the DCED process itself is structurally flawed:
This is not oversight. It is a bureaucratic ritual that has been allowed to continue without consequence. The Real-World Problems for Residents and Taxpayers When the information taxpayers rely on is either missing entirely or later proven incomplete or inaccurate, the consequences land squarely on Exeter residents:
This lackadaisical attitude toward a basic legal requirement should not be acceptable in local or state government. Taxpayers have a right to timely, reliable financial information—not excuses or silence. What Happens Next: The April 15 Newspaper Publication (or Lack Thereof) We are now past April 15, 2026, and—once again—the required concise financial summary for the year ended December 31, 2025, has not appeared in the Reading Eagle. This is not a minor administrative slip; it is the latest chapter in a multi-year pattern of outright ignoring a clear mandate in the Second-Class Township Code. Why does Exeter Township continue to disregard this statutory requirement year after year? The law is unambiguous. The publication is not optional. It exists to provide at least a minimal level of public notice so residents can see how their tax dollars are being managed. When township officials simply fail to comply—without explanation, without correction, and without consequence—it raises serious questions about accountability and respect for the very laws that govern local government. In the articles that follow in this series, we will examine the actual DCED filings and full Withum audits side-by-side for recent years. We will document the gaps, the discrepancies, the omitted subsequent events, and what these failures mean for your wallet and for the future of Exeter Township. Exeter residents deserve better than 20th-century reporting—or no reporting at all—in a 21st-century world. True oversight begins with accurate, timely information that is made available to the public. Until the system is modernized or local officials voluntarily exceed the legal minimum, independent watchdog efforts like this one are essential. Stay tuned. We will continue reading closely—even when the required notice never appears. Exeter United is committed to non-partisan, fact-based analysis of township finances and governance. Questions, documents, or tips? Contact us at exeterunited.com. Figure in $millions  Bill Heim excluded the capital projects for a good reason! It drives the reserve balances NEGATIVE. At the end of 2030 reserves would be negative $2.8 million. Of course this can’t happen, so what he is not telling us is expect additional debt issues, my guess is another $20 million sometime in 2027. So lets talk more about out Heim’s five year forecast: (huge tax increases without any increased benefits?)
Evaluation of Exeter Township's Five-Year Financial Forecast Exeter Township, a second-class township in Berks County, Pennsylvania, is governed by the Second Class Township Code, which mandates the adoption of a balanced annual budget where estimated revenues (including any prior-year surplus) must equal or exceed estimated expenditures, with no deficits permitted in the adopted budget. This requirement applies strictly to each year's official budget, adopted by December 31, but does not prohibit multi-year forecasts from projecting future imbalances as a planning tool. The township's five-year financial forecast (covering 2026–2030), presented by Township Manager William Heim, projects growing operating deficits as a forward-looking analysis rather than a binding plan. However, the distinction is blurred by the township's ongoing reliance on reserves to mask structural issues, as evidenced in the 2025 budget. The forecast assumes conservative growth rates and excludes capital projects, equipment replacements, or upgrades to focus on operating trends. It projects revenues increasing at about 1% annually, driven primarily by the earned income tax (EIT, ~$5 million in 2025) and a stable but flat real estate assessment base. Expenses are forecasted to rise 3–4% per year, led by wage and health care costs under labor contracts, with police at 5% growth. Operating deficits are projected to escalate from ~$1.5 million in 2025 to nearly $3.9 million in 2030. To maintain Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) minimum fund balance levels without depleting reserves entirely, the forecast estimates cumulative real estate tax increases of 10.202 mills by 2030 (raising the rate from 4.685 mills in 2025 to ~14.887 mills), starting at 0.371 mills in 2026 and peaking at 3.052 mills in 2030. The 2025 adopted budget reveals an operating deficit of $1,486,021, covered by transferring ~$1.4 million from reserves (including $1.35 million in interest from the Wastewater Treatment Sale Proceeds Fund and $65,000 from the Reserve Fund) and using $71,021 from existing fund balance—contradicting earlier reports of a mere $68,000 deficit and confirming heavy reserve drawdowns to achieve "balance." Total general fund revenues are $17,447,122 (operating $16,032,122 plus transfers), with expenditures at $17,518,143, dominated by personnel costs ($12.25 million, or 70%). The township holds ~$40 million in unassigned reserves (part of $52.6 million total beginning balances across funds), equivalent to over two years of the $17 million budget, but this buffer is eroding due to structural imbalances. Currently debt-free, the township is issuing $12 million in bonds, with proceeds directed toward the ~$25 million fire station (exceeding 23,000 sq ft) for the private non-profit Exeter Township Volunteer Fire Department (ETVFD), supplemented by ~$10 million from reserves for the station and another ~$10 million from reserves for potentially unneeded facilities upgrades for police, public services, and administration supporting 66 full-time employees. Salaries and benefits exceed $10 million (58%+ of budget), highlighting personnel bloat. Developable land is scarce, with much protected as farmland under Berks County's Agricultural Conservation Easement program, restricting building lots and reinforcing the flat assessment base. The 127-acre Reading Country Club was sold for $4.8 million, with rezoning potential for apartments, but outcomes are uncertain. The 17-acre Promenade property, controlled by the Berks County Redevelopment Authority (BCRDA), has seen failed sales (e.g., a deal collapsed in March 2025), with no developer interest despite requests for proposals. BCRDA's track record focuses on low-income housing amid claimed shortages, making optimistic assumptions of mixed-use (e.g., apartments/hotels) unrealistic and unlikely to boost revenues significantly. Overall, while the forecast promotes transparency, it underplays the township's precarious position: strong reserves mask unsustainable trends, with limited growth prospects exacerbating revenue stagnation. The 2025 budget's reserve raids set a dangerous precedent, and planned capital outlays—totaling ~$20 million from reserves for the fire station and facilities upgrades, plus $12 million bond proceeds for the station—appear misaligned with fiscal realities, accelerating reserve depletion. The forecast and 2025 budget warrant sharp criticism for perpetuating fiscal irresponsibility amid clear warning signs:
REFER TO THE CHART ABOVE ON RESERVE BALANCES: Estimated Impact on Reserves To assess the forecast's implications, consider the effects of 1% annual revenue growth versus 3.5% average expense escalation, plus added costs: ~$883,000 annual debt service for $12 million bonds (20-year at 4%) starting 2026; ~$300,000 annual fire station maintenance (1.2% of $25 million construction, typical for public buildings) starting 2027; ~$250,000 annual library donations (ongoing, added conservatively from 2027 if not fully in base forecast); and one-time capital draws from reserves of ~$10 million for the fire station and ~$10 million for facilities upgrades, assumed in 2026 when bond issuance and construction align. The $12 million bond proceeds are an inflow used directly for the fire station, offsetting part of its cost without further reserve impact beyond the specified $10 million.The township's unassigned reserves would be drawn down each year to cover imbalances and capital if no corrective actions (e.g., tax hikes or cuts) are taken. Starting from ~$40 million at the beginning of 2025, after the 2025 drawdown of ~$1.5 million, reserves enter 2026 at $38.5 million and continue depleting. Key Notes on Impact:
Recommendations for Proper Action To address the projected imbalances while complying with the Second Class Township Code's balanced budget mandate, the township should adopt a multi-pronged strategy focusing on compliance, efficiency, and growth, tailored to leverage remaining reserves, scrutinize capital plans (e.g., scaling back the oversized 23,000+ sq ft fire station or facilities upgrades), trim bloat, and navigate land scarcity. Actions can be categorized as short-term (for 2026 budget) and long-term (through 2030). Short-Term Actions (2026 Budget Cycle)
I’ve identified the flawed thinking and I have made recommendations. unfortunately, this group of characters can never adjust their thinking and I suspect we are doomed to the worst of the above scenario. With lawsuits sucking additional monies from the reserve particularly the SEVEN lawsuit suggesting “BID RIGGING” could lead to a substantial settlement. The township has an inexperienced (in my opinion) Solicitor who seems to enjoy the courtroom. It’s doubtful that anyone currently on the board or in management has the skill, experience and the leadership to right this ship. Exeter Township's Salary Shenanigans: A Taxpayer's Nightmare of Mismanagement and Mystery Raises10/8/2025 Folks, as a concerned resident of Exeter Township, I've been digging into our local government's handling of employee salaries, and what I've uncovered is nothing short of a fiasco. In 2022, amid a revolving door of township managers, two top financial employees—Sarah Busch and Kristina Kerper (nee Johnson)—each scored not one, but TWO salary bumps in the same year, both ending up at exactly $72,000. That's right: Busch went from around $56,776 in 2021 to $58,479 with a 3% raise in March, then jumped to $72,000 in August—a total of about 26.8% for the year. Kerper followed suit, from her prior salary (around $59,728 based on the pattern) to $61,516 with a 3% increase in March, then also to $72,000 in August, for a similar outsized hike of roughly 20.5%. Meanwhile, most township employees stuck to the standard 3% bump. Why are our two key finance folks suddenly at the exact same pay level, like they're co-captains of the money ship? It reeks of some backroom equalization without explanation, especially since they're the ones overseeing budgets and taxpayer dollars—talk about a conflict waiting to happen.At the time of those August 2022 increases to $72,000, Busch was the Accounting Officer in the Administration Department (as listed in her unredacted 2021 letter), and Kerper was the Assistant Finance Director (per her March 2022 letter). These are the township's top financial watchdogs—handling budgets, payroll, and our hard-earned money—yet they're handed identical salaries with no apparent justification beyond vague nods to "loyalty" and "dedication" in the August letters from interim manager Betsy McBride. Loyalty to what? The chaos? And let's not gloss over Kerper's credentials: her resume boasts a Bachelor of Arts in Finance from Ashford University in Arizona, July 2012. But Ashford was a notorious online degree mill, slammed for predatory practices, with the U.S. Department of Education discharging billions in student loans for deceived borrowers and warning that degrees from there are often worthless or unrecognized by employers. How does someone with a questionable degree like that end up as Assistant Finance Director, pulling in $72k after undocumented raises? It's mind-boggling, and it raises serious questions about hiring standards in our finance department. And it gets worse when you look at Busch's salary history. Hired in 2018 at $52,000, she saw minimal annual bumps: to $53,517 in 2019 (about 3%), $55,122 in 2020 (3%), $56,776 in 2021 (3%), then the March 2022 3% to $58,479. Steady as she goes, right? But then McBride swoops in after May 2022 and cranks it to $72,000 in August. From there, it escalates: $82,300 in 2023 (a 14.3% leap), $84,357 in 2024 (2.5%), $91,500 in early 2025 (8.5%), and later in 2025, a totally undeserved (given the crass lack of any director level output) promotion to Director with another bump to $95,000. That's an 82% increase from her starting pay in just seven years, with massive jumps post-2022. What's changed? From what I can see, there's been minimal increase in her skill level or qualifications during those intervening years—no advanced degrees mentioned beyond her MBA in 2018, no major certifications, just routine accounting work. If her resume (which I've got from public records) shows a solid but unremarkable background, how does that warrant these windfalls? It feels like favoritism on steroids, not merit. Let's break this down further. It all started with the firing of long-time manager Jeff Bartlett in March 2022 for "questionable practices"—whatever that means, since transparency isn't exactly Exeter's strong suit. In steps Clarence Hamm as interim manager, who hands out the usual 3% raises in February/March, citing performance and dedication in letters that look professional and straightforward. Fair enough, right? But then, chaos ensues. Hamm gets the boot amid allegations of blackmail exposed by Jerry Geleff (yeah, that messy scandal), and the Board of Supervisors contracts Keystone Municipal Solutions in May to provide an interim manager while hunting for a permanent one. Enter Betsy McBride, the Keystone contractor who starts on May 16. Just three months later, on August 17, she issues letters boosting Busch and Kerper to $72,000 effective August 21! Her justification? "Loyalty" and "willingness to accept increased responsibilities." Loyalty? That's not in any other salary letter I've seen, like Bartlett's 2021 note to Busch praising "accomplishments." Smells like favoritism to me, especially since these raises blew past the budgeted 3% norm without a peep from the Board. No performance reviews, no board approvals, no budget amendments—just poof, more money.And where was the Board of Supervisors in all this? Chairman George Bell (a professional financial consultant at Fidelity Investments, of all places—shouldn't he know better about fiscal responsibility?), Vice-Chairman Theodore (Teddy) Gardella, Michelle Kercher, David Vollmer, and myself. I was the only one who protested the board's failure of oversight, but it fell on deaf ears. These folks are supposed to be our watchdogs, yet they let interims run amok with our tax dollars.And get this: when I filed Right-to-Know requests for supporting docs, current manager Bill Heim flat-out says "no supporting documents exist." No emails, no evaluations, nothing. The RTK officer didn't even bother responding; Heim handled it himself with a curt denial and zero proof of a search. This isn't just sloppy—it's a blatant lack of good faith under Pennsylvania's Right-to-Know Law. I've appealed to the Office of Open Records, because if these records "don't exist," it means someone dropped the ball big time.But the red flags don't stop there. McBride's letters had weird redactions right under the names—claimed as "addresses" by the township, but they're tiny black bars in the spot where job titles and departments appear in every other letter. Addresses? Give me a break; these are internal memos, not postcards. It looks like they're hiding positions to dodge scrutiny. And McBride? After her interim gig, the township pays a $9,000 premium to buy her out from Keystone and make her permanent in 2023—only for her to quit 4-5 months later, leaving bloated payroll in her wake. This screams violations: the Second Class Township Code requires board oversight for big fiscal deviations like this. The Sunshine Act demands public discussion for policy-level decisions—no closed-door deals. And the State Ethics Act? "Loyalty" raises during a management meltdown could easily cross into conflicts or improper influence. An interim contractor shouldn't have carte blanche to hand out windfalls without board input; that's not authority, that's overreach.Exeter residents, we're footing the bill for this disorganization. Supervisors bungled their watchdog role, letting interims run wild. It's unprofessional, unethical, and unacceptable. We deserve answers: Why these massive raises? Where's the documentation? And why the secrecy?I've attached scans of the letters and Kerper's resume for proof—her banking background is solid, but that doesn't justify undocumented bonuses from a questionable degree. Join me in demanding transparency: contact the supervisors, file your own RTKs, and let's hold them accountable. Exeter United—time to unite against this mess! #ExeterTownship #TransparencyNow #TaxpayerWatchdog      
BELOW IS A PAGE BY PAGE ANALYSIS OF THE BUSCH RESUME AND FINAL ASSESSMENT REGARDING HER NEW ROLE AS DIRECTOR OF FINANCE. PREPARE FOR INCREASED CONSULTING FEES AND CONTINUED LACK OF TRANSPARENCY. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO SEE THE RESUMES OF OTHER CANDIDATES FOR THIS POSITION WHO WERE REJECTED ... OR WAS THERE EVEN A POSTED REQ? Page 1: This page serves as the resume's header and introduces the candidate's most recent work experience at SEI Investments. It includes her name (Sarah Nelson Busch, MBA Candidate), redacted contact information, and the start of her role as Revenue Analyst - Staff Accountant I from July 2017 to present (noting the resume appears to date from around 2018, given the anticipated MBA graduation). The duties listed focus on daily compilation, analysis, and handling of confidential client data from large private banks and financial institutions; acting as the point of contact for creating new client accounts using AS400; reviewing client contracts for fee structures based on legal language; invoicing recurring and one-time projects with competing deadlines; and communicating with business and relationship managers to ensure billing accuracy.
Analysis: This section highlights strong operational accounting skills in a high-stakes financial services environment, emphasizing attention to detail, system proficiency (e.g., AS400), and client-facing communication. It demonstrates her ability to manage confidential data and meet deadlines, which could translate to handling sensitive township financial records and budgeting timelines. Critique: The format is unconventional for a resume, using full-sentence "I" statements that read more like a self-appraisal than concise bullet points, making it verbose and less scannable. There's redundancy in phrasing (e.g., repeated emphasis on legal and structural aspects of contracts). Additionally, the page has significant white space and redacted elements that disrupt flow, potentially indicating poor tailoring for the application .Page 2: This page continues the SEI Investments role and transitions into her prior position at Non-Appropriated Funds Accounting for the 48 Force Support Squadron (RAF Lakenheath, UK) from June 2013 to August 2014 as an Accounting Technician. SEI duties expanded here include assisting in monthly/quarterly/yearly close processes via revenue accruals and ledger reconciliations; compiling audit documentation; importing assets from various systems for accurate fee accrual; involvement in a data validation project; daily payment application and reporting past dues; creating invoice/accrual variance reports with explanations for variances over 10%; and gaining knowledge in time management and interconnected processes. The Air Force role begins with her serving as Team Lead for the accounts receivable department managing a $4 million fund. Analysis: The SEI continuation shows depth in financial closing, auditing, and data-driven decision-making, with project involvement indicating adaptability to system migrations—skills relevant to township budget audits and financial software management. The Air Force intro suggests early leadership in government-adjacent finance (military non-appropriated funds), including oversight of a modest fund, which aligns somewhat with public sector budgeting. Critique: Again, the narrative style with long sentences dilutes impact; bullet points would better quantify achievements (e.g., "reduced processing time by X%"). The page jumps abruptly between roles without clear section breaks, and some phrasing is awkward (e.g., "tie outs" could be "tie-outs" for clarity). No metrics are provided for the data validation project's success, weakening the claims. Page 3: This page details the Air Force Accounting Technician role, including an award as 48 FSR Employee of the Quarter (October-December 2013); gaining knowledge in financial/budgetary principles for public/private sectors; supporting sound financial programs; applying Air Force methods to analyze reports and execute solutions; advising managers on strategies; assisting in month-end/fiscal year-end closes; training employees on data processing; and analyzing financial data to uncover discrepancies and recommend corrections via oral/written communication. Analysis: This emphasizes analytical and advisory skills in a quasi-governmental setting, with experience in financial reporting, discrepancy resolution, and training—potentially useful for township audit preparations and staff supervision. The award adds credibility to her performance, and the focus on human relations highlights soft skills for stakeholder interactions in local government. Critique: The language is repetitive (e.g., multiple mentions of "knowledge and skill" without variation) and overly self-promotional, resembling a performance review rather than a resume. Lack of specific examples or quantifiable outcomes (e.g., how many discrepancies resolved or training sessions led) makes it feel generic. The page ends mid-role, creating an incomplete feel without a smooth transition. Page 4: This page concludes the Air Force role and introduces her position at Yeager Supply, Inc. from January 2008 to March 2012 as Credit/Collections Associate & Accounts Receivable Clerk. Air Force wrap-up includes resolving confusions/errors to prevent instability; gathering data for account adjustments with evidence for management; training new employees; attending a Financial Management Course in March 2014 for skill enhancement; and gaining insight into chain of command and accountability. Yeager duties start with overseeing client contacts for delinquencies and negotiating terms, including weekly reports and Friday progress updates to the controller. Analysis: The Air Force conclusion reinforces training and compliance experience, drawing parallels to business accountability that could apply to township financial oversight. The Yeager intro demonstrates hands-on collections and negotiation, relevant to revenue collection in a township (e.g., taxes, fees). Critique: Transitions between roles are clunky, with the page splitting content unevenly. Phrasing has minor errors (e.g., "TDY to the AFPC" assumes familiarity with acronyms without explanation). The narrative continues to prioritize "I" statements over action-oriented verbs, and the 2014 course post-dates the role's end date (2014), which might confuse timelines. Page 5: This page expands on the Yeager Supply role, including researching credit applicants and making approval/denial decisions; training/managing a co-worker; developing a streamlined credit assessment system that reduced gathering time from 20 to 5 minutes; handling charge disputes with research and client contact; learning time management/multi-tasking via Microsoft Excel, Outlook, and Sage Mas 90; serving as liaison to the controller with secretarial duties like meeting planning; and daily written/oral correspondence with supervisors/clients. Analysis: This showcases process improvement (e.g., system integration for efficiency) and multi-tasking, which are valuable for optimizing township financial operations like billing or software use. The quantifiable metric on time reduction is a strength, demonstrating impact, and software proficiency aligns with administrative needs. Critique: While this page includes one strong quantifiable achievement, others lack metrics (e.g., how many clients handled or disputes resolved). The role's early dates (2008-2012) make it somewhat dated by 2025 standards, and the inclusion of secretarial tasks dilutes the focus on finance expertise. Verbose descriptions could be condensed for brevity. Page 6: This page concludes the Yeager role with office machine experience and lists education: Master's in Business Administration (anticipated May 2018, GPA 3.9/4.0) and Bachelor's in Accounting (August 2011, GPA 3.39/4.0, Cum Laude) from West Chester University. It also includes affiliations (West Chester University Alumni Association - Lifetime Member) and a professional publication ("The World of Accounting: Looking Into the Future," 2009, with link). Analysis: Education credentials are solid, with high GPAs and an MBA relevant to strategic financial leadership. The publication, though early, shows thought leadership in accounting trends, potentially useful for forward-thinking township budgeting. Critique: The page mixes role wrap-up with education, creating a disjointed structure—education might belong earlier. The publication is outdated (2009), and the link may be broken or irrelevant now. No certifications (e.g., CPA) are mentioned, which could be a gap for a finance director role. Page 7: This page lists references (three redacted entries, including from Yeager Supply and Tower Health, with one noted as professional) and additional information: 3rd place in a writing competition for the Pennsylvania Institute for Certified Public Accountants (Philadelphia Chapter) on the Future of Internal Auditing; software experience (MS Suite: Excel, PowerPoint, Access, Outlook, Word; Sage Mas 90; MAC OS; AS400). Analysis: References provide verifiable contacts, and the competition prize reinforces writing/communication skills for reports or grants. Software list demonstrates technical proficiency for financial tools in a township setting. Critique: References are sparse (only three), and the "*" for professional reference is unclear. Additional info feels tacked on; integrating skills earlier would strengthen the resume. No mention of government-specific software or recent updates (e.g., post-2018 skills). Page 8: This page lists miscellaneous skills: Advantage Fee - A Fiserv System; Typing Speed: 40 WPM; Experienced using office machines (Fax Machines, Copiers/Printers/Scanners, 10-Key Calculator, Phone Systems). Analysis: These basic administrative skills support day-to-day operations, and Fiserv familiarity could relate to financial systems used in government. Critique: This page is extremely short and feels like filler, with outdated or entry-level skills (e.g., typing speed, office machines) that don't elevate a director-level candidate. It contributes to the resume's excessive length without adding substantial value. Page 9: This page is an image of her Master of Business Administration diploma from West Chester University, awarded May 5, 2018, with signatures and seal. Analysis: Verifies the MBA completion, adding credibility to her educational claims and showing commitment to advanced business knowledge. Critique: Including a full-page diploma scan is non-standard for resumes and bloats the document; a simple line under education would suffice. It may raise privacy concerns if not redacted properly. Full Analysis in Context of the Position: The position of Director of Finance in a second-class township in Pennsylvania involves overseeing a $20 million annual budget for a community of 25,000. Based on relevant sources, key responsibilities include preparing and administering the annual budget in collaboration with the township manager; supervising accounting, revenue collection, payroll, and financial staff; ensuring compliance with state laws and audits; managing billing, taxes, and expenditures; compiling financial reports and presentations; coordinating with committees for budget reviews; and acting as a steward of public funds to ensure cost-effective operations and fiscal stability. This role demands strong leadership, governmental accounting expertise (e.g., fund accounting, GASB standards), strategic planning, and experience with public sector budgeting, often requiring 5-10+ years of progressive finance experience, supervisory roles, and preferably certifications like CPA or CGFM. Sarah Nelson Busch's resume demonstrates a foundation in accounting with approximately 6-7 years of experience by the resume's timeframe (2008-2018), primarily in private sector financial services (SEI Investments, Yeager Supply) and a brief stint in military non-appropriated funds (Air Force). Strengths include hands-on skills in revenue management, contract review, invoicing, audits, process improvements (e.g., reducing data gathering time by 75%), and software proficiency (e.g., Excel, AS400, Sage), which could support operational aspects like billing and reporting. Her MBA (completed 2018) and high GPA indicate analytical depth and business acumen, while leadership elements—like team leading AR for a $4M fund, training staff, and project involvement—show potential for supervision. The military experience provides some exposure to structured financial programs and accountability, loosely analogous to public sector oversight. However, significant gaps exist relative to the role. The resume lacks direct local government experience, which is critical for navigating Pennsylvania-specific regulations (e.g., township codes, budget ordinances). Her roles are mostly operational/staff-level, not strategic or director-level, with limited emphasis on large-scale budgeting, public fund management, or policy development. The $4M fund she managed is smaller than the township's $20M budget, and there's no evidence of handling public taxes, grants, or multi-department coordination. The resume's format is a major weakness: at 9 pages, it's excessively long and narrative-driven, potentially indicating poor communication or lack of tailoring. Timelines suggest possible employment gaps (e.g., 2012-2013, 2014-2017), and as of 2025, the "present" at SEI (starting 2017) implies no updates, raising questions about recent progression. No certifications, public sector affiliations, or advanced governmental finance knowledge are noted.Overall, while Busch has transferable skills in accounting operations and a solid educational background, her experience skews entry-to-mid-level and private/military-focused, not aligning closely with the senior, public-oriented demands of a township finance director. Recommendation: Do not recommend hiring Sarah Nelson Busch for the Director of Finance position. Her resume shows competence in tactical accounting but lacks the requisite senior-level experience, supervisory depth, and specific public sector expertise needed to manage a $20 million township budget effectively. Without demonstrated proficiency in governmental accounting, budget leadership, or PA township regulations, she may struggle with the role's strategic and compliance aspects, potentially leading to inefficiencies or errors in public fund stewardship. Instead, consider candidates with 8+ years in municipal finance, relevant certifications, and proven budget management in similar-sized governments. If her recent experience (post-2018) has advanced significantly, an updated resume and interview could reassess this, but based on the provided document, she appears better suited for a mid-level finance role rather than directorial leadership.   This ia a continuation of the lack of transparency in our government. The Finance Director left on Sept. 8, and the township held a meeting on Sept. 29th, discussing issuing $12 million in bonds, the upcoming budget period but never mentioned the Director of Finance left for another job. This isn't an oversight, it happens far too often.
Submitted August 24, 2025. The request was for the invoices submitted by J. Chadwick Schnee and paid on August 8th Accounts Payable Distribution. As the date shows above, the township answered on September 2, 2025 and promise the information before or on October 2, 2025. TODAY!    Concerns Regarding the Sale of the Exeter Promenade Property:The attached Letter of Intent (LOI) from Seven Development Group, LLC, dated July 21, 2023, presents a formal offer to purchase the Exeter Promenade property (Tax ID# 43-5326-14-43-5099) for $3,000,000. This proposal included a cash payment to be completed within 60 days, contingent upon standard conditions such as zoning relief for the proposed end use, no restrictions on development from the Perkiomen Streetscapes Project, and allowances for utility installations. The LOI further specifies the buyer's intent to develop a multi-story senior living facility, including independent single-story townhomes, memory or hospice care, and multi-story apartments with a central clubhouse—demonstrating a clear commitment to a community-oriented project.In light of this offer, questions arise regarding the decision to pursue an alternative transaction with the Reading Development Authority (RDA) in March 2024, which involved a total purchase price of $3,000,000 structured as a $100,000 cash downpayment and a $2,900,000 zero-interest purchase money mortgage. Under these terms, no principal payments were required until RDA sells the property to a third party, potentially allowing RDA to leverage the asset for additional financing while deferring obligations to the township. Subsequent documents indicate that Seven Development Group was aware of and prepared to comply with Second Class Township Code requirements, suggesting their proposal was viable and aligned with regulatory standards.This raises several key inquiries for Solicitor J. Chadwick Schnee (who served in this role throughout the relevant period), Interim Township Manager Larry Piersol (also serving throughout), and the Boards of Supervisors at the time of the Seven LOI in July 2023 (Chairman George Bell, Vice Chairman Ted Gardella, and Supervisors Kircher, Vollmer, and Hughes) and at the time of the RDA sale in March 2024 (Chairman John Piho, Vice Chairman Hamm, and Supervisors Bell, Kircher, and Hughes):
Many more documents to follow, we will post the complaint in its entirety next. This community needs to wake up to the questionable actions of our supervisors. THIS SHOULD THROW COLD WATER ON THIS RIDICULOUS FIRE STATION IDEA FOR $23,000,000.DON'T YOU THINK?
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